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Executive summary 
This JRC Science for Policy Report focuses on competitiveness aspects related to batteries 
as a key enabling technology for electric mobility and stationary storage. The report fits 
within the overall JRC effort aimed at addressing European industrial competitiveness as 
outlined in the Clean Energy Package [1] and serves as input to the definition of the 
overall Enabling Framework for the Energy Union. 
Following an introduction, the document reviews recent cost and market evolution of 
Lithium-ion battery (LIB) cells (chapter 2 and 3 resp.), focussing on e-mobility and 
stationary energy storage applications. This is followed by an overview of current and 
announced global capabilities for large-volume manufacturing of LIB cells in terms of 
capacity and geographical location (chapter 4). Chapter 5 lists opportunities for the EU to 
become competitive in LIB manufacturing and is followed by an overview of investment 
costs related to the establishment of industrial LIB cell manufacturing facilities (chapter 
6). Chapter 7 provides available data on job creation potential associated to establishing 
LIB manufacturing capacities. Finally, chapter 8 identifies the conditions that have to be 
fulfilled for establishing a globally competitive LIB cell manufacturing chain in the EU, 
additional factors that can support the business case, and suggests measures that the 
Commission can take to support their realisation and thereby enable EU industry to take 
its share in a globally booming market. 
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1 Introduction 
This JRC Science for Policy Report builds upon the JRC Science for Policy Report Li-ion 
battery value chain and related opportunities for Europe [2] issued in December 2016 by 
providing updates on LIB deployment estimates for electric vehicle applications (xEV: 
BEV, PHEV, HEV), as well as extending its scope to include LIB for stationary energy 
storage (ES) applications. The report elaborates further on the potential of and suggests 
the measures that need to be implemented for achieving a globally competitive LIB cell 
manufacturing industry in the EU. 
The cost of and domestic capacity to manufacture LIB cells and battery pack systems 
have a direct impact on the EU's ability to compete with the global market leaders in this 
sector. Cost and manufacturing targets with a time horizon up to 2030 were agreed in 
2016 between EU industry, Member States and the Commission. These targets are 
enshrined in a Declaration of Intent (DoI) on batteries for e-mobility and stationary 
storage applications [3] which has been prepared in the frame of the Integrated SET-Plan 
[4]. Accordingly, and because of the relevance of manufacturing cost and capacity to EU 
competitiveness in the battery sector, these targets are considered in this document. 
While LIB performance in the two major application areas of xEVs and ES is a decisive 
factor for their large-scale deployment, battery performance and related targets are not 
considered explicitly in this document. This does not eclipse their importance to 
competitiveness since the performance and safety of any advanced European battery 
technology in any application will need to be as good as, if not better than, those of 
competing incumbent technologies. High performance and safety are a prerequisite to 
competitiveness and therefore considered a given in the following discussion. 
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2 Cost evolution of LIBs  
Recent cost evolution (past and projected) of LIB a is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Annex 
I provides background information on methodologies used for cost projections and on the 
sometimes (quite) different results obtained from their application. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Evolution of LIB component, cell and pack costs for EV applications [5]. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Evolution of LIB cell and system costs for EV and stationary storage application [6]. 
 
                                           
a  Studies on battery costs do not always differentiate between cell, pack and system level. This is one of the 
reasons why quite different numbers for "battery costs" appear in the literature; other reasons are discussed 
in Annex I. 
 4 
It should be noted that some sources already now indicate lower costs for LIB cells than 
those shown in Figs. 1 and 2 (or imply lower cell costs because of claimed lower pack 
costs):  
 EV battery cell prices <200€/kWh for OEMs [7] 
 Audi buys batteries at $114/kWh cell price [8] 
 General Motors paying $145/kWh for the LIB of Chevy Bolt [9] 
 lithium-ion-batteries selling for under $140/kWh [10] 
This indicates that cost targets for packs in the DoI of 90 €/kWh in 2022 and 75 €/kWh in 
2030 for EV and of 150 €/kWh for ES by 2030 are feasible (see also Fig. I.3 in Annex I). 
 
Two main causes can be discerned for the drastic cost decreases shown in Figs. 1 and 2: 
 steady improvement of battery performance (primarily energy density) through 
sustained R&D aimed at improving materials, reducing the amount of non-active 
materials, reducing the cost of materials, improving cell design, increasing 
production speed and improving production yield. This has resulted in lower costs 
at both cell level and battery pack level. 
 increased production volumes, particularly in China, bring economy of scale to 
lithium-ion battery manufacturing. According to [5], LIB global manufacturing 
investments in the period 2011-2014 exceeded 10-12 B$ for 50 GWh additional 
capacity, leading to an average specific investment cost of $250/kWh. In the 
period 2014-2017 average specific investment costs decreased to $150/kWh. 
 
The effect of production volume on cost of LIB packs (2015 figures) is shown in Fig. 3 
which indicates a levelling-off of pack cost towards $175/kWh for BEV batteries for 
production volumes exceeding 200,000 packs/year [11]b. This pack level cost is reported 
to be equivalent with a LIB cell cost of $100/kWh, which is widely considered by battery 
experts to trigger acceleration of storage technologies uptake, both for e-mobility and for 
stationary applications. Such a cost is deemed achievable by 2025 or by 2030 at the very 
latest [12, 13, Annex I] and may lead to a situation where global demand for LIB cells 
outpaces production capacity available at that time (see chapter 4). In fact, an 
acceleration of the uptake of xEVs has most recently been forecasted to occur even 
earlier, particularly in Europe, as of 2020 onwards [12].  
 
Figure 3:  Dependence of LIB pack cost for xEV on production volume [11]. 
                                           
b See considerations in Annex I on costs levelling-off. 
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The evolution in the ratio between LIB cell and pack/system costs for EVs shown in Figs. 
1 and 2 is expected to be affected by the degree of vertical integrationc along the battery 
value chain. This is mainly because products in the segments upstream of cell 
manufacturing (see chapter 5) represent commodities in a cost-driven world market, 
whereas downstream from cell manufacturing they depend on the application and are 
therefore value-driven. Enhanced vertical integration – as expected in the 
mega/gigafactories currently being planned (see chapter 4) – is expected to decrease the 
cost ratio between LIB packs and cells.  
The lower degree of vertical integration along the production chain explains why LIBs for 
energy storage applications have not fully realised the same economies of scale as for EV 
applications (Fig. 2 and Fig. I.1 in Annex I). Whereas energy storage costs have dropped 
considerably and will continue to fall, they are expected to continue to lag cost 
development in the xEV market, which has first-mover advantage in a currently larger 
volume market (see chapter 3). 
When interpreting technology cost reductions as presented in Figs. 1, 2, 3 above, it 
should be realised that the cost of application of the considered technologyd, and hence 
its competitive position versus incumbent technologies, is additionally affected by 
technical performance parameters, such as e.g. technology lifetime, efficiency, etc. 
 
 
Take-Away #1: 
The costs of LIBs continuously decrease and will soon reach a level that triggers 
their wide-spread, accelerated deployment in xEVs and ES applications. 
                                           
c  Vertical integration is the combination in one company of two or more stages of production normally 
operated by separate firms, aimed at reducing costs by decreasing transportation expenses and turnaround 
time. 
d  known as the application-specific levelised cost 
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3 Markets for LIBs 
Current and projected annual global market forecasts for LIB from a number of recent 
sources [5,6,14,15,16,17,18] are summarised in the table below (market values are 
expressed at cell level):  
 
 Market (GWh) Value (B$) notes 
2016 2020 2025 2016 2020 2025 
All 
applications 
78 130-
250 
210-
535 
18.5-
20.6 
28-48 36-88 Consumer products, 
power tools, e-
mobility, energy 
storage 
Growth 
factor 
compared 
to 2016 
 2.3 
(1.7-
3.2) 
4.3 
(2.7-
6.8) 
 1.9 
(1.4-
2.6) 
2.9 
(1.7-
4.8) 
 
xEVe, f 33 60-
116 
105-
300 
7.5-
9.5 
12-34 16-63 LDV + buses, >50% 
in China alone 
Growth 
factor 
 2.5 
(1.8-
3.5) 
5.4 
(3.2-
9.1) 
 2.4 
(1.3-
4.5) 
3.8 
(1.7-
8.4) 
 
Non-
automotive 
(excl. 
consumer) 
0.3 1.4 6.2 0.2 1.2 4.5 
 
by 2025 50% marine  
Growth 
factor 
 4.8 20.7  6.0 22.5  
ES 1.5-
4.7 
9-18 17-48 0.5-
1.3 
2.5-6 4-10 LIB technology 
assumed to increase 
from 70% (2016) to 
>95% (2020 and 
beyond) of all new 
installed capacity; 
2nd use not 
considered 
Growth 
factor 
 4.8 
(1.9-
12.) 
11 
(3.6-
32) 
 4.8 
(1.9-
12) 
7.8 
(3.1-
20) 
 
Table 1: Global market forecasts and increase factors in terms of size and monetary value for 
different applications of LIBs [sources as indicated in text]. 
                                           
e  Market volume numbers for xEV consider the scenarios for xEV (BEV, PHEV, HEV) deployment numbers as 
well as the evolution in battery capacity needed for the different types of xEV. 
f  The numbers for xEV in 2025 in [12] are considerably higher because of the forecasted earlier mass uptake: 
256-1331 GWh, corresponding to 23-120 B$. Similarly, [13] forecasts 408 GWh capacity for EVs (light duty 
vehicles only) in 2025 and 1.3 TWh in 2030, and 81 GWh ES in 2024. 
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Fig. 4 shows that the largest global deployment share of LIB till 2025 will be in xEV, 
whereas deployment of LIB for ES, while starting from a smaller base, is projected to be 
approximately twice faster than for xEV applications throughout the considered period 
(Fig. 5).  
 
Figure 4:  Share of different applications of the total global market for LIB [average estimates 
from sources used for Table 1]. 
 
 
Figure 5: Growth factor (in terms of GWh(20xx)/GWh(2016)) for global LIB deployment in 
different applications [median values from Table 1]. 
 
Market forecast numbers for xEV in Europe range from 14 to 24 GWh in 2020 and from 
37 to 117 GWh in 2025, with the lower estimate corresponding to a conservative 
scenario and the higher estimate to an optimistic scenario) [19]. The forecast average 
corresponds to around 22% of the global xEV market in 2020, increasing to around 35% 
in 2025g.  
  
                                           
g Not considering the forecasted earlier mass uptake of xEVs in [12] and [13]. 
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Market forecasts for batteries for ES applications in Europe are given in [20], starting 
from an installed capacity in 2016 of 5.3 GW, increasing to 7.6-9.8 GW in 2020 and 
11.5-14.5 GW in 2025. These numbers, in unit of power (GW) instead of energy (GWh)h, 
indicate growth factors of 1.6 till 2020 and of 2.5 till 2025. A number of reasons may 
explain the difference with the increase factors shown for ES applications globally in Fig. 
5: deployment number and type of storage facilities, share of LIB in battery storage 
facilities, etc.  
 
 
Take-Away #2: 
The global market for LIBs in xEV and ES applications is huge. xEVs will represent 
the largest market in the near future, whereas expected growth rates are highest 
for ES applications. Most recent market forecasts for both applications are being 
revised upwards. 
                                           
h  The power capacity (GW) of storage cannot directly be translated into energy capacity (GWh) because this 
depends on the discharge time and the number of charge-discharge cycles.  
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4 LIB cell manufacturing capacity 
In 2015 the world’s total LIB cell manufacturing capacity amounted to 60 GWh and was 
primarily located in China, Japan, and Korea [2]. Together, these countries hosted 88% 
of total global LIB cell manufacturing capacity for all end-use applications. Asian 
countries were also home to a significant share of the LIB-specific materials global 
manufacturing capacity in 2015: cathodes (85%), anodes (97%), separators (84%), and 
electrolytes (64%). This concentration of cell manufacturing capacity and upstream 
supply chains contributes to LIB industrial clusters in each of these countries [2], which 
strengthens their competitive position vis-à-vis the rest of the world, through vertical 
integration or through joint ventures covering successive segments in the production 
chain up to and including cell manufacturing.  
The global dominance of Asian LIB cell manufacturers is also reflected in the trade of LIB 
materials and cells [21]. Fig. 6 (left) shows the positive trade balance of Asian producers 
and the negative trade balance for other world regions in 2014 for LIB cells for all 
applications. The right hand side illustrates the magnitude of trade flows between 
countriesi.  
 
 
Figure 6: Flow of LIB cells between major trading partners (dark shades represent exports, 
lighter shades represent imports) [21]. 
 
The chart in Fig. 7 [6] shows the evolution of the LIB production capacity considering 
available, ongoing and announced capacities targeting xEV and ES applications: 
production capacity is expected to rise from ca. 70 GWh in 2015 over 150 GWh in 2016 
to 260 GWh by 2020. Similar numbers, more than doubling in 5 year, from 103 MWh in 
2016 to 278 MWh in 2021 are mentioned in [16], as well as in [12]: from 80 GWh in 
2016 to 285 GWh in 2020. 
                                           
i  More recent information on trade flows than dating from 2014 could not be found. 
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Figure 7: LIB cell production capacity for xEV and ES worldwide (from [6], based on info from a 
number of sources]. 
 
Figure 7 shows that, with the exception of the Tesla-Panasonic factory (35 GWh), only 
companies in Asia contribute to the expanding global LIB manufacturing capacity for 
xEVs and ES. In China alone up to 9 factories are being constructed which will raise 
production capacity from 16 GWh at present to a total of 107 GWh in 2020 [22] and 120 
GWh in 2021 [23], thereby bringing China's share in global LIB production to 65%. 
Some of these new plants are expected to be huge, with the CATL facility at 50 GWh 
being by far the largest. However, not exclusively Chinese companies are involved in 
manufacturing capacity increases in China; also Korean, Japanese and US companies 
contributej. 
Whereas Fig. 7 shows the expected global nominal capacity increases for LIBs for xEV 
and ES till 2020, Fig. 8 includes projections till 2025 on "realistic" capacity increases, 
considering the maximum yield of present-day factories and the degree of actual 
capacity utilisation [7]. Fig. 8 also includes an optimistic and a conservative xEV+ES 
demand projectionk. For both the optimistic and conservative scenario, the projected 
demand is expected to exceed the estimated realistic capacity in 2022-2023.  
While East-Asian companies dominate cell production and until recently contributed 
practically exclusively to the ongoing and planned capacity expansions, a number of 
plans for giga-factories in other parts of the world have been announced over the last 
months [24], [25]: Thailand (50 GWh by 2020), US (15 GWh in New York State, 4 GWh 
in Los Angeles), Australia (2 locations, resp. 1 and 15 GWh), India (unspecified location 
and capacity, [26]), EU (see Table 2 below), evidencing the tendency for cell production 
to increasingly locate closer to areas of expected demand growth. Also Asian companies 
are establishing factories for cell components in other parts of the world, such as e.g. a 
separator factory in Europe [27]. 
                                           
j  Conflicting information exists on capacity increases in China by non-Chinese companies. 
k  In line with the data in Table 1, i.e. not considering the earlier mass uptake of xEVs forecasted in [12], [13]. 
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Figure 8: Global LIB cell production capacity for xEV and ES (lines) and projected demand 
evolution (shaded areas) [7]. 
 
The current lack of a domestic LIB cell manufacturing base in the EU jeopardises the 
competitive position of EU industrial customers of LIBs for xEV and ES applications 
because of security of supply chain issues, increased costs due to transportation, loss of 
part of the value, time delays, relinquished control on quality and limitations on design 
options. Whereas establishment of a domestic LIB cell manufacturing chain by European 
manufacturers is the obviously preferred option to address this competitive 
disadvantage, Korean cell producers have already seized the opportunity and are 
currently establishing cell manufacturing capacity in Europe in which, to strengthen their 
position, they go for vertical integration from component to pack production [19]l. The 
opposite also applies to some extent: European battery pack assemblers investing in 
facilities in China and extending into local battery cell manufacturing through a local joint 
venture, as demonstrated by the recent investment made by a major European car 
manufacturerm [28].  
 
Table 2 lists known initiatives and plans for establishing battery cell/pack manufacturing 
in Europe for xEV and ES applications. The only currently operational facilities by EU 
companies in the EU are a number of relatively small manufacturing and assembly 
plants. 
 
                                           
l  Whereas not embarking on production in Europe yet, CATL (China) is establishing R&D facilities in Germany, 
and has started collaboration with European automotive manufacturers PSA and BMW. 
m  Daimler through BBAC, its joint venture with BAIC. Such investments offer the advantage of allowing 
foreign manufacturers to avoid the 25% import tariff that applies to imported vehicles being sold in China. 
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Who Where Annual Capacity When Comments references 
CELLS 
LG Chem (KR) Wroclaw, PL 100.000 EV batteries, > 2 GWh  2018  29,30,31,32 
Samsung SDI (KR) Göd, HU 50.000 EV batteries, 2.5 GWh 2018H2  33,34 
SK Innovation (KR) HU or CZ ? 2018H2  35 
Tesla (US) with Panasonic (JP) DE, others?n ?   36,37 
Northvolt (SE) ?, SE 8 GWh initially,  
32 GWh final 
2020 - 2024  Target cost 80-110$/kWh; 
 Use of well-known, foundry-based manufacturing 
process;  
 vertical integration; new chemistries >2025;  
 aims at being replicable 
38,39 
TerraE (DE) DE  
(2 locations) 
6-8 GWh; 
34 GWh (2028) 
2028 final  consortium consisting of companies throughout 
the supply chain including infrastructure, 
manufacturing planners, material producers, 
machine engineering groups, cell manufacturers 
and industrial consumers 
 EV + ES 
 Operated according to the "foundry principle" 
 Development of cells based on results from Giga-
LIB project (DE) 
40,41,42,43 
SERI (IT) IT 200 MWh 2018  Preparing vertical supply chain in IT 
 EV+ES 
44 
Monbat (BG) Nordhausen, DE ? ?  Merger of two existing companies into new entity 
EAS Batteries 
 First LFP, later other chemistries 
45 
PACKS 
Nissan (JP) Sunderland, UK 60.000 packs,  
1.5 GWh 
2013 cells from AESC (joint venture between Nissan and NEC, 
JP), taken over by GSR (China)  
46 
BMZ (Deutsche Accumotive)o Kamenz, DE 80 million packs totalling 5 GWh 2018-2020 cells from LGChem 47,48 
Kreisel Electric GmbH  Rainbach, AT 800 MWh  cells from Samsung 2 
Continental Nuremberg, DE 330 MWh 2008  2 
Dow Kokam (KR) FR 105 MWh   2 
Bolloré FR 300 MWh    2 
BYD (CN) HU 400 buses 2018  49 
Table 2: Initiatives and plans for LIB cell and pack producing facilities in the EU 
                                           
n  Locations in EU candidate for establishing a Tesla gigafactory are: Trollhattan (SE), Vaasa (FI), Tilburg (NL), Kamenz (DE), Fessenheim (FR), Paterna (ES), Guarda (PT) 
o  Daimler Deutsche Accumotive (Daimler battery subsidiary) will triple its pack production capacity by building a second plant. Daimler shut down its cell manufacturing 
subsidiary Li-Tec in 2015. 
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Fig. 9 compares the expected market volume of xEVs in the EU (see chapter 3) with the 
expected evolution of cell manufacturing capacity in Europe from Table 2 and 
demonstrates that currently known planned cell production capacities in Europe are likely 
to be sufficient to meet the minimum projected European demand for xEVs in 2025, but 
would definitely not suffice for meeting the maximum demand estimate. The figure also 
reveals that 2030 targets included in the DoI are likely to be met. 
 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of planned production capacity in Europe, European xEV demand and 
manufacturing volume targets from the DoI [3]. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that in the aftermath of "dieselgate", VW has announced 
stepping up its production of EVs. Whereas VW currently relies on external battery 
suppliers, management has made a pledge to create 9000 new jobs in the area of 
battery production and mobility services at factories in Germany as part of efforts to 
shift toward electric and self-driving cars [50]. In 2016 VW reckoned it will require about 
150 GWh of battery production capacity per year (date unspecified) and indicated it 
considers using solid-state batteriesp, which would require an investment of 10 B€q. 
Recently also Toyota has indicated intention to use solid-state batteries for its future EVs 
as of 2022 [51]. 
Most recently VW predicts that, should all OEMs target 25 percent of sales volumes from 
battery electric vehicles by 2025, there will be a massive shortage of LIB cells as 
demand raises to some 1.5 TWh r (equivalent to 40 Tesla gigafactories, each with an 
annual capacity to produce 35 GWh of lithium ion cells) [52]. To reduce this 
manufacturing volume need, VW is currently investigating powering its future EVs with 
higher energy density lithium-sulphur cells. 
 
 
                                           
p  Solid state batteries (generation-4 LIBs, see chapter 5) offer higher energy density (higher range), 
enhanced intrinsic safety and reduced charge time compared to lower-generation LIBs, but still suffer from 
lower cyclic performance. 
q  In this context, it is worth noting that Bosch has bought US solid-state battery maker Seeo in 2014, a move 
that could make it a potential candidate for localized cell making in Europe. 
r  The associated capacity need even exceeds the highest estimate of demand for xEV in [12] and [13] of 1.33 
TWh.  
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Take-Aways #3-5 
 Current LIB manufacturing capacity is concentrated in Asia and is not able to 
meet the increasing global demand for xEV and ES. LIB cell manufacturers, in 
particular Asian ones, are investing in additional and new production 
capabilities close to the major demand centres, i.e. in Asia, US and Europe. 
 The absence of domestic LIB cell manufacturing in the EU negatively affects 
the competitiveness of European xEV producers and ES service providers. 
 Currently known planned cell production capacities in Europe are expected to 
suffice for meeting the minimum estimate of xEV deployment in Europe in 
2025, but most likely will not be able to meet the maximum projected 
demand. 
  
 15 
5 Opportunities for EU competitiveness in LIB cell 
manufacturing  
Fig. 10 depicts the battery value chain [2] and highlights that it contains a transition 
from cost-dominated to value-dominated segments. In the latter, such as battery pack 
manufacturing, the decisive criterion for a positive business case is the ability to meet 
the specific requirements of the customer (both OEMs of xEVs and ES operators). Hence, 
competition at global level does not play an important part for LIB pack manufacturing. 
The following discussion therefore does not consider EU competitiveness in LIB pack 
manufacturing. 
 
 
Figure 10: LIB value chain (based on [2]). 
 
On the other hand, segments in the chain upstream from pack manufacturing, covering 
materials processing, manufacturing of components and of cellss, are primarily cost-
dominated and therefore subject to worldwide competition. Considerations on EU 
competitiveness should hence in first instance cover these segments and target 
technology innovation in cell chemistries, in cell formats and in cell manufacturing 
technologies/processes.  
This view is confirmed by the results of a survey carried out among European battery 
experts on the position of the EU in the global battery value chain compared to that of 
the rest of the world in the frame of the Batstorm project [20]. As indicated in Fig. 11, 
EU-based companies are perceived strong only in the downstream stages of the battery 
value chain and overall weaker in the materials and cell manufacturing segments. 
Measures to enhance EU competitiveness should therefore in first instance target these 
segments. 
It is to be noted here that global competitiveness of EU industry in the LIB sector – and 
the associated benefits for growth and jobs – critically depend on the ability for EU 
industry to also serve non-EU markets with battery cells and packs, as well as with final 
products (xEV and ES products). This applies specifically for being able to supply the 
boosting xEV market in China. Therefore trade barriers which hamper market access of 
foreign-produced final products should be removed, as well as requirements on a 
minimum share of domestic production of LIBs that needs to be incorporated in these 
end productst. 
                                           
s  In general, LIB cells are to some extent customised to the end-use application and their manufacture is 
therefore also partly value-driven. 
t  In the 2016 list of companies allowed to supply batteries in China, not a single foreign company is included. 
Draft guidelines issued at the end of 2016 moreover specify that battery manufacturers need a minimum of 
8 GWh annual production capacity in China in order for car owners to qualify for EV purchase subsidies; only 
2 Chinese producers (BYD and CATL) can meet this requirement.  
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Figure 11: Rating of EU position in the global LIB value chain [20]. 
At present, optimised LIB cells of generation-1 and -2a (Fig. 12, [19]) represent the core 
technology for xEVs and for ES. Given the lead time from R&D on battery materials to 
their actual incorporation in large scale production of cells, these generations – and 
incremental improvements to them – are expected to remain the chemistry of choice for 
at least the next 10 years. Because manufacturing capacity build-up for these 
chemistries is already ongoing in Asia – particularly in China – it does not seem effective 
to spend significant efforts to establish a mass production chain in Europe on cell 
chemistries up to and including generation-2a u. Efforts for establishing manufacturing 
capacity in Europe should hence primarily target LIB cells of generation-2b and beyond 
and should moreover focus on the operations in the production chain which are critical to 
quality of the end-product, as they represent areas where IP may confer competitive 
advantagev. Furthermore, advantages gained in these production processes may be 
transferable to other end-applications and thereby offer increased market potential. 
 
Figure 12: Classification of LIB cell chemistries [19]. 
                                           
u  This obviously does not rule out continuation and/or uptake of EU industrial involvement in the production of 
components for generation-1 and-2a LIBs, which is also a production chain segment subject to global 
competition (see e.g. Umicore new capacity in China and South Korea at existing sites for production of 
NMC cathodes for automotive applications).  
v  This applies primarily for cathode manufacturing and explains why many of the Asian cell manufacturers 
also produce their cathodes themselves. 
current 
> 2025 ? 
~ 2025 
~ 2020 
 17 
When assessing the attractiveness and feasibility of establishing LIB cell manufacturing 
capacities in Europe the following aspects should be considered:  
(1) access to supply (in terms of import dependence of raw materialsw),  
(2) cost competitiveness,  
(3) added value beyond cost which may differentiate EU companies from Asian 
incumbents, and 
(4) sustained R&I efforts.  
These factors are discussed below. 
5.1 Supply of materials 
Critical materials for LIB (i.e. those having high supply dependence and economic 
importance) are cobalt, natural graphite and silicon metal [2]. China dominates global 
production of natural graphite and of silicon metal and steadily increases its control of 
cobalt productionx . Moreover, whereas lithium itself is not considered a critical material, 
China is home to the majority of the world’s lithium refining facilities. As a result, China 
has acquired and is still expanding its dominant position in the LIB supply chain and 
there is little possibility for EU industry to become competitive in raw material supply for 
LIB.  
However, building up and strengthening EU activity in material supply may have a pay-
off in terms of reduced future dependence on imported battery component materials 
(particularly Co and Li, and high-purity Ni later on) for cell manufacturing and of 
shortening supply distances and times. This can be achieved through: 
 developing domestic sourcing of Li (Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Czech Republic, 
Serbia), Co (Finland), graphite (Sweden) – this approach is being investigated for 
the establishment of a battery megafactory in Scandinavia [53] and of a 
production facility for cathode materials in Europe [54].  
 substitution of Co by other materials (already ongoing for optimised cathodes) 
and mitigating the dependence on their supply (e.g. by expanding EU domestic 
production of high-grade Ni). 
 increasing the volumes of recycling/reuse of battery materials.  
However, raw materials (and cell components) sourced from the EU will not be able to 
meet the demand. Hence, security in their supply is a precondition for setting up LIB cell 
manufacturing capabilities in the EU. 
5.2 Enhanced cost competitiveness 
Identifying measures to reduce costs requires analysis of the cost structure. Major cost 
components for LIB cells are material (supply and logistics), labour, energy, 
depreciation, R&D and SGA (selling, general and administrative expenses). Battery cells 
typically account for 70% of the total value of the battery pack (see Fig. 1), and cell 
costs are roughly composed of 50% materials and 50% manufacturing.  
5.2.1 Materials related costs: 
Because all cell manufacturers, including foreign incumbents, have to import raw 
materials, there is no direct competitive disadvantage for the EU from the raw material 
supply side. Non-EU manufacturers may however benefit from lower transportation 
distances, times and costs for acquiring the high-purity materials needed for cell 
manufacture. In this respect, Asian LIB manufacturers, and Chinese ones in particular, 
                                           
w  From a non-technological point of view also the availability of and access to competences, labour and capital 
is important. 
x  In particular by increasing its control of Co-production in the Democratic Republic of Congo which produces 
more than half the global supply and of which the price has doubled over the last year. 
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have a competitive advantage because of the concentration of Li-refining capacity in 
China. In future, exploitation of indigenous EU resources of Li from geothermal brines 
may partially relax this situationy [55]. 
Cost for materials can be reduced through the development and large-scale production 
of better performing materials for cathodes, anodes, separators and electrolytes. In this 
area, Europe can profit from its high quality R&Dz, covering both material design and 
development, as well as manufacturing processes and technologies.  
Additionally, increased recycling of materials from end-of-life batteries in the EU will 
result in reduced need of primary raw materials and lower material transport costs. 
Accordingly, the DoI [3] targets 70% battery collection/takeback by 2020 and 85% by 
2030, and 50% recycling efficiency by 2020. Also increased use of LIBs after they have 
reached their end-of-life in a first-use application contributes to reduced material needs 
and costs. 
5.2.2 Cell manufacturing costs: 
Costs for cell manufacturing are typically composed of energy (10%), labour (10%), 
maintenance (20%) and depreciation (60%)aa [56]. Because labour constitutes a minor 
part of manufacturing costs, the difference in wages in Asia, China, US and EU does not 
have a large impact. On the other hand, established (i.e. Asian) cell producers have a 
cost advantage resulting from production scale and expertise, supply chain optimisation, 
vertical integration and partnerships that have been developed over the last decades in 
LIB manufacturing for consumer electronic applications. 
As shown in Fig. 3, cell manufacturing costs critically depend on the manufacturing 
volume. A 2015 model-based analysis [7] of the overall manufacturing costs for LIB cells 
(generations 2a, 2b and 3a) for BEVsbb as a function of the manufacturing volume has 
revealed that for a maximum allowable manufacturing cost of 130 €/kWh in 2020, the 
manufacturing of 2nd generation LIB cells is not economical in Germany for volumes 
ranging between 1 GWh/y and 13 GWh/y. The threshold production volume for LIB of 
generation-3a to become economical lies at 9 GWh/y. The model reveals that under 
these conditions, mass manufacturing in Germany can be competitive with that in Korea 
and in China (Japan was not included in the analysis). Other sources [57] indicate a 
2019 threshold production capacity of 4.5 GWh/y, for a 100 €/kWh threshold 
manufacturing cost. 
5.3 Offering added value beyond cost 
Competing with foreign global economies (especially in Asia) in the battery sector on a 
cost-only basis is difficult, considering the supply and market advantages enjoyed by 
Asian players. To overcome this and gain competitive ground, Europe needs to 
differentiate itself on other factors including (environmental) sustainability and safety, as 
well as performance.  
The EU competitive position can benefit from more efficient use of resources resulting in 
a reduction of the energy, CO2 and material footprints in the overall manufacturing 
chain. As illustrated in Fig. 13, the largest contributions to energy use and therefore to 
CO2 emissions along those segments in the production chain in Fig. 10 which are subject 
to worldwide competition, originate from electrode production (cathode and anode) [58].  
Typically, the energy required to manufacture a LIB is about 500 times its energy 
storage capacity. This can be lowered by increasing process efficiency, through e.g. 
                                           
y  As product of long-term water-rock interactions at elevated temperatures at depth, brines contain dissolved 
chemical components at various concentrations. Despite the low concentrations, they contain significant 
quantities of select minerals that could be recovered due to the large volumes of brine used by geothermal 
power plants. A project coordinated by ERAMET is currently ongoing under the EIP on Raw Materials.  
z  Note however that Europe lags behind in number of patents for Li-ion batteries and applications: only Bosch 
(DE) and CEA (FR) figure among the top-30 global entities holding Li-ion patents [20]. 
aa  These numbers vary with cell chemistry and format. 
bb  For cell types and formats used in PHEVs, higher costs prevail (see Fig. 3). 
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reducing the size of dry rooms, through optimizing process steps (e.g. 
reduction/elimination of formationcc) and by better overall integration allowing re-use of 
energy. EU has a well-developed equipment manufacturing industry which should be 
able to capitalise on this to secure its place in the attractive growth market of LIB cell 
manufacturing plantsdd.  
 
 
Figure 13: Primary energy consumption and CO2 emissions for LIB manufacturing [58]. (GWP = 
Global Warming Potential) 
 
The high energy intensity of electrode production underscores the importance of 
availability of cheap energy for competitivenessee. From the point of view of reducing 
CO2 footprint, switching to renewable energy for cell manufacturing is an obvious 
approachff. Furthermore, locating battery cell production in Europe avoids the CO2 
emissions linked to the transportation to the EU of cells manufactured in Asia, with 
added benefits in terms of reduction of associated time and cost. 
Reduction of waste can be achieved by process-measures (such as e.g. replacing organic 
solvents in electrode fabrication and use of biodegradable materials) and by enhanced 
use of and improving the efficiency of recycling processes. EU industry has a well-proven 
track record in the latter and should exploit and strengthen its dominant positiongg. In 
particular, it can profit from implementing cost-effective recycling approaches able to 
deal with the several different LIB chemistries used in different types of xEVs according 
to their specific needs for energy, power, safety, lifespan and cost.  
                                           
cc  A controlled charge and discharge cycle designed to activate the battery materials. 
dd  Some EU equipment suppliers (Manz, PEC) already serve Asian cell producers and could exploit their know-
how for the benefit of establishing state of the art LIB cell manufacturing plants in the EU. 
ee  Access to cheap energy is even more relevant when considering possible upstream integration with refinery 
operations which are also very energy-intensive. 
ff  This approach is applied in the Tesla gigafactory and is also claimed a major consideration for locating the 
Northvolt manufacturing facility in Scandinavia. 
gg  The ongoing revision of the Battery Directive 2006/66/EC is critical in this respect. 
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Further added value can come from enabling second use of lithium-ion automotive 
batteries after first use. When xEV LIBs no longer meet the requirements for continued 
use in a vehicle, they still retain sufficient energy storage capacity which can be 
potentially re-purposed and deployed for stationary storage applications [59] and 
thereby results in a reduction of the lifetime cost of ownership of the batteryhh. However, 
full exploitation of the 2nd-life potentialii requires additional efforts for assessing and 
quantifying the technical feasibility as well as the environmental, economic and social 
impacts of xEV battery second use. The former requires a structured methodology for 
State of Health (SoH) assessment [60], whereas the latter needs systematic analysis 
through Life Cycle Assessment.  
The competitive position of EU industry in setting up and operating new state-of-the-art 
LIB cell manufacturing capacities can also benefit from being able to ensure higher 
operational safety along the LIB cell production chain than that achieved in existing 
plants and avoid accidents such as those that have occurred in a number of cell or 
battery pack production facilities worldwidejj [61], [62]. Also numerous accidents have 
occurred at battery recycling facilities [61]. Although the exact cause for many accidents 
remains unknown, some of them have been linked to human errors in either the product 
and process design, or in testing product quality and safety. Possible measures to 
improve safety in the production chain include selection of more intrinsically safe 
materials [63] (e.g. less flammable and less toxic electrolytes), increased process 
automation, use of better fit-for-purpose testing methodologies, improved battery and 
cell labelling to facilitate the sorting process [64], etc. 
Manufacturing process-related innovation measures to seize the competitiveness 
opportunities described above are discussed in Annex II.  
In addition to the factors identified above which directly affect LIB cell manufacturing, 
opportunities also exist for European industry actors to establish and/or strengthen their 
global competitive position in the overall e-mobility and stationary storage markets. This 
applies in first instance for EU battery plant manufacturers, but also for other actors in 
the overall LIB value chain. Whereas upstream from cell manufacturing some EU 
industries are already active in the production of LIB electrode materials and/or want to 
establish an activity in this area in Europe [54]; downstream these include producers of 
battery management systems, of power electronics suppliers, system integrators, grid 
integrators (V2G) and battery recyclers. 
Further opportunities arise for stationary storage applications because batteries in 
general and LIB in particular cannot meet the demand for high energy storage capacity 
combined with high power capacity over the range of response/discharge times required 
in a number of applications [65]. Such applications necessitate the development of 
hybrid energy storage systems to deliver power capacity, energy duration and cycle life 
in a single system. In particular the increased complexity in hardware (inverters, 
converters, …) and software for hybrid energy storage systems offers economic 
opportunities [66]. 
Finally, it should be noted that EU competitiveness in the LIB sector will also benefit from 
deployment of LIBs in numerous other applications besides xEVs (incl. vans and buses) 
and ES, such as 2- and 3-wheelers, material handling vehicles (forklifts, tow trucks), 
ferries, medical devices, garden equipment, cordless power tools, etc., which also 
constitute a growing market relying on the availability of safe and high-performant LIBs. 
                                           
hh  Currently Renault-Nissan, BMW, VW and BYD have linked up with utilities for exploiting used xEV batteries 
for stationary storage purposes. 
ii  Estimated globally at 3.6 GWh in 2025 to 12 GWh in 2030 [59], resp. at 26 GWh by 2025 [13], non-
negligible compared to the market for 1st life ES applications in Table 1. 
jj  explosion at Matsushita Battery Industry factory in Japan in August 1997, large fire at the BMZ battery pack 
manufacturing facility in Germany in August 2008, fire in February 2017 at the waste depository of 
Samsung SDI facility in China. 
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5.4 Need for sustained R&I efforts 
To be able to exploit the above indicated measures to establish a competitive position in 
LIB cell manufacturing, there is a need for sustained and even stepped-up R&I efforts. 
Recent Commission Communications and Staff Working Documents have outlined the 
priorities for batteries, including LIB [67], [68]. Additionally, the Implementation Plan of 
Action 7 of the Integrated SET-Plan, to be delivered by Nov. 2017, will outline the 
activities, actors and means by European industry, Member States and the Commission 
to realise the set of targets contained in the DoI [3].  
 
 
Take Aways # 6-9 
 Considerations on EU competitiveness in LIB cell manufacturing should target 
innovation in cell chemistries, formats and manufacturing technologies/processes. 
 Efforts for establishing LIB cell manufacturing capacity in the EU should primarily 
target LIB cells of generation-2b and beyond and should focus on production 
stages which are critical for LIB quality, performance and safety. 
 Competing with non-EU LIB cell producers on cost-only basis is unlikely to be 
successful. A competitive EU LIB cell production should offer added value beyond 
cost, in terms of enhanced sustainability, safety and performance. 
 Sustained and even increased R&I efforts, covering materials and manufacturing 
processes in terms of technical, safety and sustainability performance are needed 
to underpin competitive battery manufacturing in the EU. 
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6 Investment costs for setting up LIB production capacity 
Learning curves (see Annex I) can be exploited to estimate the cumulative financial 
effort required for establishing a given production volume of technology products, e.g. 
LIB cells or packs. As shown in Fig. I.2 of Annex I, using a single historical data set of EV 
battery manufacturing prices (used as proxy of cost) as a function of the cumulative 
installed capacity, the overall budget required for deploying 300 GWh of EV batteries 
globally by 2025 (as per Table 1), is estimated at 39 B$. Assuming no change in learning 
rate, the larger predicted global demand in [12], [13] of 1.3 TWh by 2025 would require 
around 80 B$.  
Table 3 lists investment costs published for a number of planned/announced LIB cell 
mega-factories (unless otherwise indicated, references as in Table 2) as well as from a 
recent German study [19]:  
 
LIB cell production plant Capacity 
(GWh/y) 
reported 
investment cost 
Specific 
investment cost 
NPE [19] 13  1.3 B€ 100 €/kWh 
NPE [19] 4.5  700 M€ 155 €/kWh 
Tesla (Nevada) 35  5 B$ 142 $/kWh 
Panasonic (China) [69] 2.5  0.5 B$ 200 $/kWh 
LG Chem (PL)  2  340 M$ 170 $/kWh 
Samsung SDI (HU) 2.5  300 M€ 120 €/kWh 
Northvolt (SE) 32  4 B€ 125 €/kWh 
TerraE (DE) 8  1 B€ 125 €/kWh 
Energy Absolute (Thailand) [70] 1 88 M$ 88 $/kWh 
Dynavolt (CN) [71] 6 400 M€ 67 €/kWh 
VW (DE)kk [50] 150  10 B€ 66 €/kWh 
Table 3: Investment costs of planned LIB cell manufacturing plants. 
 
The investment costs estimated for new to-be-built LIB cell manufacturing plants from 
Table 3 are shown as a function of their production capacity in Figure 14. The figure also 
includes the estimated required financial effort as a function of additional manufacturing 
volume derived from the learning curve considered in Annex I, as well as the specific 
investment costs quoted in [5] for the periods 2011-2014 and 2014-2016. The slight 
overprediction of investment costs by the solid curve can be explained by the pack to cell 
cost ratio (see e.g. Figs. 1, 2). Based on the good agreement between all data, the 
investment cost corresponding to the expected needed manufacturing capacity increase 
in Europe can be determined from the curve shown in Fig. 14. 
                                           
kk Solid state batteries 
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Figure 14: Investment cost as a function of additional pack production capacity. The solid curve is 
taken from Annex I, whereas symbols refer to the announced investments listed in 
Table 3 (the data point corresponding to solid-state LIB (green symbol) has not been 
considered in the regression). Dashed lines represent specific investment costs 
mentioned in [5].  
 
 
Take Aways # 10-11 
 Learning curves – although subject to a number of intrinsic and data availability 
limitations - enable the projection of future technology costs, from which the 
cumulative investment needed for deploying the technology (in this case LIBs) 
can be estimated. The latter can subsequently be used to assess the investment 
costs for setting up new, additional manufacturing capacity.  
 Specific investment costs for new LIB cell manufacturing capacity has decreased 
to around $ 150/kWh and will further decrease as additional manufacturing 
capacities come on line. 
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7 Job creation potential 
Establishing a domestic LIB cell production industry is expected to have a major effect 
on employment in the EU. The aforementioned German study [19] estimates creation of 
1050 to 1300 new direct jobs for a 13 GWh/y capacity plant requiring an investment of 
1.3 B€: 750-900 employees working in 4 shifts, 150-200 in administration, procurement 
and sales and another 150-200 in R&D. More than 3000 indirect jobs could be created 
within the immediate vicinity of the cell producing plant for suppliers, subcontractors, 
logistics, mechanical engineering, construction and automatization companies. Published 
data on job creation from other sources are included in Table 4 (unless otherwise 
indicated, references as in Table 2).  
 
LIB cell production plant Capacity (GWh/y) expected job creation 
NPE [19] 13 1300 direct, 3000 indirect 
Tesla (Nevada) 35 6500  
Panasonic (China) [72] 2.5 500  
Northvolt (SE) 32 2500-3000 direct, 20000+ indirect 
TerraE (DE) 8 400 direct 
Boston Energy and Innovation 
(Australia) [73] 
15 1000 in manufacturing, 1000 
direct support, 5000 indirect 
VW (DE)ll [52] 150 9000 
Table 4: Job creation potential of planned LIB cell manufacturing plants. 
 
Fig. 15 shows the number of direct jobs created as a function of the annual production 
capacity based on the data in Table 4. For the range of cell manufacturing capacity 
covered, between 90 to 180 direct jobs are expected to be created per GWh of LIB cells 
produced annually (excluding solid-state). 
 
 
Figure 15: Estimated number of direct jobs created [data from Table 4, data point corresponding 
to solid-state LIB (red symbol) not considered in the regression].  
                                           
ll  Solid state batteries 
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Whereas the job creation numbers listed in the above table and figure refer to cell 
manufacturing, the establishment of new LIB cell production capacities in Europe in 
response to the globally booming market of xEVs and ES is expected to strengthen all 
European industries active along entire the battery value chain. In this context, the US 
Supercharge initiative, a public-private partnership proposed in 2016 for co-funding by 
the Department of Commerce and aimed at achieving US global leadership in advanced 
battery manufacturing, has an objective of supporting 180 GWh of domestic LIB 
manufacturing capacity with an estimated 120.000 job creation potential [74]. 
Comparing the latter number with the data in Fig. 15 reveals a multiplication factor 
between the total number of jobs created along the complete value chain and the direct 
ones created in cell manufacturing in the range of 3.7 to 7.5, which agrees with the ratio 
of indirect to direct jobs created from the available data in Table 4.   
 
 
Take Away #12 
Establishing a competitive LIB cell manufacturing capability in the EU is expected 
to create between 90 and 180 direct jobs per GWh/y production volume.  
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8 Requirements for competitive domestic EU LIB cell 
manufacturing 
Establishing competitive LIB cell manufacturing in Europe by European companies is 
feasible but depends on two main factors: reducing risk for private investors (see 
investment costs in Table 3 and Annex I) and realising economies of scale. To achieve 
this, a set of conditions have to be met: 
 Industrial cell production is primarily targeted at "advanced" LIB chemistries, i.e. 
generation-2b and beyond 
 A secure material supply is guaranteed, as well as access to non-EU markets 
 Flexibility in the design of the facility allows for manufacturing of different 
chemistries and sizes/formats 
 The facility has a sufficiently large capacity, say > 5 GWh/y, to enable 
exploitation of technology learning 
 The plant can be operated for a long enough period at a sufficiently high capacity 
utilisation rate to enable generating profit following the period of negative cash-
flow upon production start 
 A skilled competent workforce is available 
 
If the above "sine qua non" requirements can be met, the following factors contribute 
positively to a business case by strengthening the position of European newcomers vis-
à-vis Asian manufacturers who "copy and paste" from their proven manufacturing lines: 
 Geographical proximity of customers, in first instance of OEMs of xEVs (reduction 
of transport costs, facilitation of exchange of technical specifications, fast 
response and delivery times) 
 Establishment and exploitation of synergies and knowledge spill-overs through 
co-location, vertical integration or joint ventures along the production chain, at 
least up to and including cell manufacturing (borrow from the Airbus model?) 
 Reduced energy and CO2 footprint 
 Optimum re-use of end-of-first-life xEV batteries or of materials recycled from 
them 
 Diversification to non-xEV markets, in particular ES and high-value niches such as 
power tools 
 Adequate provisions for IP protection 
 Reduced time for siting and permitting processes 
 
While fully realising that decisions on mass production of LIB cells in the EU are in the 
hands of EU industry, the Commission can undertake the following actions to reduce the 
investment risk, so that EU industry can reap the benefits of a large and fast-growing 
global LIB cell and cell manufacturing market. Successful implementation of these 
actions requires commitment and active involvement of all stakeholders along the LIB 
value chain. The activities by Commission services along the value chain are shown in 
Annex III, taken from the input prepared in the formulation of the Mobility Package [75]. 
 
a) Overall Energy Union policy-level 
 Maintain and strengthen the commitment to the transition of the overall EU 
energy system, as outlined in the five overarching objectives of the Energy Union. 
In particular pursue the legislative initiatives already started with RED II, the new 
 27 
electricity market design, the revision of the CO2 emissions of LDV legislation, to 
foster deeper and accelerated integration and coupling of the power, transport 
and heat sectors through deployment of energy storage solutions, a.o. through 
the use of LIBs (DG ENER, CLIMA, MOVE).  
 As indicated in the ACEI Communication [67], make increasing use of the 
possibility under the Annual Union Work Programme for Standardisation of 
including requests to the European Standards Organisations (ESOs) to develop 
European standards to support implementation of Energy Union objectives, 
notably for the decarbonisation of the economy and support for green public 
procurement (DG ENER, JRC, GROW).  
 As outlined in the ACEI Communication [67], optimally exploit the potential of 
current EU-level financial instruments, enhance the synergies between them and 
where necessary deploy new, targeted financial instruments to lower the risk of 
investments in untested but promising clean energy technologies or business 
models and thereby contribute to more favourable market access conditions (DG 
ENER, CLIMA, ECFIN, GROW, REGIO, MOVE, COMP, …). 
 As mentioned in the ACEI Communication [67], examine options to boost market 
uptake of innovative clean energy solutions through public procurement and 
strengthen the role that public administrations can play to support smart, clean & 
innovative industry & economy (DG GROW). 
 Through supporting social, economic and financial innovation, enable all 
categories of energy end-users (individuals, companies, institutions) to assume 
and effectively implement their role in the increasingly decarbonised, 
decentralised and digitised service-based energy systems of power, transport and 
heat. 
 Step up support to establishing a skilled, competent EU work force in new energy 
technologies (producers, suppliers, maintenance and repair, permitting 
authorities, first responders, …) (DG EMPL, EAC, RTD, GROW, …). 
 Strike the appropriate balance between the conflicting aspects of protection of 
intellectual property and dissemination of research outcomes from publically 
supported R&I projects. 
 
b) more specifically for batteries: 
 ensure stable and fair access by EU industry to the supply of LIB component 
materials (import) and to international markets for LIB cells and packs, xEVs and 
ES systems produced in the EU (export) (DG TRADE). 
 Critically assess the measures and the commitment outlined by European industry 
and Member States for efforts to better focus, coordinate and integrate their R&I 
efforts on batteries for e-mobility and for stationary storage applications 
(forthcoming Implementation Plan of Action 7 of the Integrated SET-Plan) (DG 
RTD, ENER, JRC, MOVE, GROW). 
 Pursue the activities set out for the Battery Flagship Initiative under the recently 
published Mobility Package [75], covering the what-who-how of this initiative and 
play on the strengths of the Commission's convening power to arrive at common 
solutions shared between key actors in industry, public authorities, financing 
sector and research (SG, DG GROW, EPSC, JRC, RTD, COMP, ECFIN, …). 
 Prioritise access to financing for the establishment of first-of-a-kind and pilot 
production lines based on the latest and best available technology.  
 Together with stakeholders identify and propose measures for eliminating non-
technological barriers to the use of LIBs in a number of applications. 
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 Ensure that the revision of the Battery Directive (2006/66/EC) and of the End-of-
Life Vehicles Directive (2000/53/EC) strike the appropriate balance between 
environmental and competitiveness considerations and that the revisions are 
timely available for safeguarding and strengthening the EU competitive edge in 
recycling of batteries (DG ENV). 
 Maintain and expand in-house test facilities for performance and safety 
characterisation and development of an enabling set of European standards for 
next generation batteries, cells and packs (JRC). 
 Prepare for the inclusion of LIB related topics in the 2018 Annual Union Work 
Programme on standardisation; in this respect monitor the follow-up given by the 
ESOs to the conclusions of the JRC-organised Putting Science into Standards 
Workshop on batteries for e-mobility [64] (DG GROW, JRC). 
 Sustain and improve the focus of R&I funding on battery chemistries (in particular 
for electrodes and to allow fast charging), on cell design and on high added-value 
manufacturing processes (DG RTD as per Annex to the ACEI Communication 
[67]). Next to the KLIB battery competence network [76] in Germany, the 4-year 
government-funded Faraday Challenge initiative endowed with £246m recently 
launched in UK [77] is an interesting example of structuring battery-related 
research over the complete value chain, with targets set on cell cost, gravimetric 
energy density, operating temperature range and pack recyclability to be reached 
by 2035.  
 Maintain R&I support in order for EU industry not to lose its competitive edge in 
the pack manufacturing and subsequent segments in the battery value chain (DG 
RTD). 
 Enhance synergy with other relevant EU-cofunded R&I programmes, e.g. 
Graphene Flagship, Smart Manufacturing, Industry 4.0 (DG RTD). 
 
 
Take Away # 13 
For domestic LIB cell manufacturing by European companies to be globally 
competitive, two conditions have to be met: the risk for private investors has to 
be reduced and realising economies of scale must be made possible. A set of 
actions that the Commission can take to enable EU industry meeting these 
requirements is proposed. 
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9 Conclusions 
The Commission has been an early supporter of the development of batteries as a key 
enabling technology for electric mobility and for achieving Energy Union objectives on 
energy storage. Following their successful deployment in consumer electronics, LIBs are 
currently the main chemistry being pursued for these applications and this is likely to 
remain so for the next decade. However, the EU does not have a complete LiB value 
chain albeit being competitive in several of its segments: the EU is lagging on production 
of active materials and cell manufacture, whereas its competitive strengths reside in 
downstream segments (packing, applications) and in its good potential to become a 
global leader in recycling.  
Given the growing strategic interest in batteries for achieving EU policy goals, the 
Commission is reflecting on the need and activities to be deployed for establishing large-
scale LiB cell manufacturing in Europe for mobility as well as for stationary storage 
applications. To underpin future decision-making towards this, the present report has 
reviewed cost and market volume projections for LiBs and has looked into factors 
affecting EU competitiveness in the different stages of the LiB value chain. The major 
findings can be summarised as follows: 
 
Economic potential for LIBs for mobility and stationary storage applications: 
 The costs of LIBs continuously decrease and will soon reach a level that triggers 
their wide-spread, accelerated deployment in xEVs and ES applications. 
 The global market for LIBs in xEV and ES applications is huge. xEVs will represent 
the largest market in the near future, whereas expected growth rates are highest 
for ES applications. Most recent market forecasts for both applications are being 
revised upwards. 
 
Adequacy of existing and planned LiB cell manufacturing capacity:  
 Current LIB manufacturing capacity is concentrated in Asia and is not able to 
meet the increasing global demand for xEV and ES. LIB cell manufacturers, in 
particular Asian ones, are investing in additional and new production capabilities 
close to the major demand centres, i.e. in Asia, US and Europe. 
 The absence of domestic LIB cell manufacturing in the EU negatively affects the 
competitiveness of European xEV producers and ES service providers. 
 Currently known planned cell production capacities in Europe are expected to 
suffice for meeting the minimum estimate of xEV deployment in Europe in 2025, 
but most likely will not be able to meet the maximum projected demand. 
 
Scope for an EU LIB cell production activity: 
 Considerations on EU competitiveness in LIB cell manufacturing should target 
innovation in cell chemistries, formats and manufacturing technologies/processes. 
 Efforts for establishing LIB cell manufacturing capacity in the EU should primarily 
target LIB cells of generation-2b and beyond and should focus on production 
stages which are critical for LIB quality, performance and safety. 
 Competing with non-EU LIB cell producers on cost-only basis is unlikely to be 
successful. A competitive EU LIB cell production should offer added value beyond 
cost, in terms of enhanced sustainability, safety and performance. 
 
Necessary enabler for an EU LIB cell manufacturing capacity: 
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 Sustained and even increased R&I efforts, covering materials and manufacturing 
processes in terms of technical, safety sustainability performance are needed to 
underpin competitive battery manufacturing in the EU. 
 
Estimation of required investments: 
 Specific investment costs for new LIB cell manufacturing capacity has decreased 
to around $150/kWh and will further decrease as additional manufacturing 
capacities come on line. 
 
Estimation of job creation potential 
 Establishing a competitive LIB cell manufacturing capability in the EU is expected 
to create between 90 and 180 direct jobs per GWh/y production volume. 
 
Based on these findings, the report identifies two major conditions for domestic LIB cell 
manufacturing by European companies to be globally competitive: the risk for private 
investors has to be reduced and realising economies of scale must be made possible. 
The report concludes by proposing a number of actions that the Commission can take to 
assist EU industry to meet these requirements and thereby enable it to take its share in 
a globally booming market. 
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LIB lithium-ion battery 
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EU European Union 
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SGA sales, general and administrative (expenses) 
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Annexes 
 
Annex I. Cost projection methodologies and results - Important points 
to consider 
 
General Considerations 
Scientific literature and market analysis reports contain a large number of cost 
projection methodologies for new technologies, incl. for LIB batteries. These 
methodologies are mostly based on "technology learning or experience" (e.g. 
[78], [79]) and express technology cost (sometimes price) as a function of 
factors such as annual (e.g. Fig. 3) or cumulative production, of cumulative 
patent number, etc. Extrapolation of the double-logarithmic relation between 
cost and the considered technology learning factor(s) established from historic 
data series allows predicting the future cost evolution.  
Cost extrapolation from learning curves presents inherent limitations. A first 
limitation is that unforeseeable future changes (disruptive technology 
breakthroughs, knowledge spill-overs, changes in commodity prices, …) as well 
as commercial selling below cost in order to capture a market share cannot be 
accounted for. Second, only the learning factor(s) included in the analysis can 
contribute to technology cost reduction. Cost decreases from other origin which 
scale differently with or do not depend on cumulative production capacity (e.g. 
raw materials, technology progress) cannot be captured. Consequently projected 
technology costs monotonously decrease as the considered learning factor(s), 
e.g. cumulative production volume, increase and a minimum cost threshold 
associated with intrinsic costs does not appear in the projectionsmm. The use of 
S-shaped learning curves may prove more realistic in such a case [80]. 
In addition to considering implications from the above inherent limitations, 
prediction of technology cost evolution through extrapolation of learning 
curve(s) should be assessed cautiously, as it is affected by the number and type 
of learning factors considered, their range used in establishing the learning 
curve, the corresponding time period, the number of data in that range and 
period, the type of mathematical relation used for numerically fitting the data, 
etc. All of these affect the result of the extrapolation and it is therefore not 
surprising that cost evolution projections in scientific literature cover a wide 
range (e.g. [20], [81], [82]).  
Integration of the cost versus cumulative production volume relation 
represented by the learning/experience curves, allows to determine the 
cumulative financial effort (consisting of capital investment and/or subsidy) 
required to achieve given cost reductions through increasing manufacturing 
volumenn.  
The time for reaching a given level of technology cost is obtained by introducing 
the future expected capacity need into a market growth model (chapter 3), from 
which projections of costs versus time, such as shown in Figs. 1 and 2, are 
subsequently derived. For such cost versus time projections, the uncertainties 
associated with the extrapolation of learning curves are compounded with those 
emanating from the market deployment scenario assumptions. 
 
                                           
mm Conversion of the logarithmic axis for the learning factor into a linear axis results in horizontal 
asymptotic behaviour of the learning curve, suggestive of – but not actually reflecting an explicitly 
included - minimum cost threshold (see e.g. Fig. 3) 
nn  see e.g. JRC Scientific and Policy Report Technology Learning Curves for Energy Policy Support 
(EUR25471 EN, 2012) and SWD(2015) 142 Investment perspectives in electricity markets 
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Application to LIBs 
For the specific case of Li-ion batteries, there are additional factors which affect 
the quality and reliability of the cost projections. One of the most important is 
the lack of differentiation between costs at cell, pack and system level, and 
indeed the lack of harmonised terminology for these levels. Another related one 
is the lack of differentiation between the applications considered: LIB for 
consumer electronics, power tools, xEVs, ES.  
The above points are illustrated in the figure below, adapted from [78] which 
contains the most extensive data set on LIB. The data points in the figure refer 
to price (not cost) as a function of installed capacity (not production volume) 
and therefore include additional cost factors such as R&D, depreciation warranty, 
profit.  
 
Fig. I.1:  Li-ion experience curves for various technology scopes (from [78], with solid 
red, blue and green lines added). Note that the term "battery" is used to 
denote portable battery for consumer electronics and that "pack" and "system" 
refer to EV and ES application respectively.  
Comparing the cost evolutions for cells and packs in Fig. I.1 indicates that cost 
reductions for EV and ES batteries can be mainly attributed to decreases in cell 
manufacturing costs and to a lesser extent to cost reductions of additional 
components required for the packs. Extrapolating to a cumulative capacity for 
EV packs of 100 GWh (green arrow, corresponding to one of the two literature 
sources for EV-data considered in the figure and assuming similar high learning 
rates as observed for high-volume production of Li-ion portable batteries and 
cells shown by the blue and red arrows) reveals a price of $170/kWh, whereas 
$100/kWh is reached for a cumulative capacity of ca. 240 GWh. 
 
For the above example (based on a high learning rate), the cumulative financial 
effort required to achieve given cost reductions through increasing 
manufacturing volume is shown by the solid blue curve in Fig. I.2, where the 
labels correspond to the cumulative manufacturing volume and the year by 
which this volume is reached (taken from Fig. 8). The figure also shows the 
contribution of the cost of cell materials from [79], which is assumed not to 
depend on manufacturing volume and acts as a lower cost threshold for the 
packs. 
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Fig. I.2 shows that starting from the 2016 price of $332/kWh for a EV pack 
production volume of 33 GWh (see Table 1), the financial effort required to 
reach a target price of $100/kWh corresponding to a cumulative pack production 
volume of 240 GWh, amounts to 33 B$oo.  
For a given manufacturing volume, subtracting the sales income from the 
required cumulative financial effort results in the cumulative financial spend 
required to manufacture (and deploy) a defined number of packs at a given 
price. If, e.g. consumers were prepared to pay a price of $100/kWh, the 
financial effort required from manufacturers to reach $100/kWh target price 
could be reduced nearly threefold from 33 B$ to 12 B$ (red curve in Fig. I.2). 
Similarly, for a pack price of $70/kWh charged to the customer, the required 
financial effort is nearly halved and decreases to 19 B$ (orange curve)pp.  
Conversely, Fig. I.2 shows that a cumulative budget envelope of 10 B$ enables 
manufacturers to reach a manufacturing cost of about $208/kWh, down 
$124/kWh from the current cost of $332/kWh, by more than doubling the 
cumulative production volume from 33 GWh to 70 GWh. Taking into account 
sales income generated from a sales price of $70/kWh, this cost is further 
reduced to $173/kWh, for a correspondingly larger cumulative production of 
about 100 GWh.  
 
 
Fig. I.2: Cumulative spend (horizontal axis) required for establishing manufacturing 
capability (labels) to produce LIB packs at a given cost (vertical axis). 
Individual curves correspond to a selected fixed price charged to the customer. 
The year number associated to a given cumulative capacity is taken from the 
optimistic demand scenario in Fig. 8. 
 
                                           
oo Assuming a 1:1 conversion $:€, the 2030 target from the DoI of 75 €/kWh requires a financial 
expenditure of around 46 B€ corresponding to ca. 390 GWh cumulative production volume in the 
EU by that time.  
pp  When fixed sales prices are assumed in the analysis, a vertical asymptote in Fig. I.2 is 
approached when costs on the vertical axis approach the sales price.  
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The projected evolution of LIB pack cost versus time derived from Fig. I.2 is 
shown in Fig. I.3, which also includes the most recent cost projections from 
other sources. The figure illustrates that cost estimates have been revised 
downward in the last two years. It also shows that the cost projections based on 
extrapolation of the learning curve shown in Fig. I.1 (green arrow, i.e. high 
learning rate) and on the optimistic demand scenario (Fig. 8) fall within the 
range corresponding to these updated lower cost estimates. Finally, the cost 
targets of the DoI seem to be quite realistic (assuming a 1:1 conversion ratio 
from € to $). 
 
 
Fig. I.3: Cost evolution for EV LIB packs compiled from a number of sources (labels 
represent actual costs). The dashed curves represent upper and lower values 
of the projected cost range in [81]. 
  
 42 
 
Annex II. Manufacturing innovation for higher efficiency and quality at 
reduced costs 
 
Technology innovations in the LIB manufacturing process should target 
achieving the opportunities for EU competitiveness identified in Chapter 5. Next 
to implementing improvements in the individual production steps resulting from 
R&D (e.g. [76]), this can be realised by (1) production scale-up, (2) higher 
stability of the manufacturing process, (3) building in flexibility, while 
simultaneously paying due attention to additional considerations with respect to 
added value beyond cost (section 5.3).  
 
1. Production scale-up  
Increasing the production volume can be achieved through multiplication of 
production lines or through increasing the production volume of the line, i.e. 
scale-up. A higher production volume is usually associated with reduced 
throughput time. Scale-up is the major enabler of technology-learning which 
contributes to manufacturing cost reduction (see Annex I). 
 
2. Increased yield 
For a given throughput volume, increasing the stability of the production 
process, e.g. through automation, results in less rejected products and thus 
higher yield. Also higher integration of electrode and cell manufacturing process 
steps contributes to increased yield by reducing the possibility for electrode 
contamination, as does the use of high speed in-situ non-destructive inspection 
techniques for quality control to detect flaws and internal short circuits. Process 
stability also benefits from increased use of automation in production scale-up. 
 
3. Flexibility in manufacturing  
Whereas measures for scaled-up and more stable production processes are not 
specific to the manufacture of LIB cells, higher flexibility in production definitely 
is, and needs to consider the different aspects of battery chemistry, format (e.g. 
cylindrical, prismatic, pouch) and size: 
The production of generation-3 LIBs for BEV does not require drastic changes to 
the production processes used for generation-2 cells. Rather it requires 
adaptations to process parameters or modifications in individual parts of the 
manufacturing chain to be able to deal with different materials for cell 
components (e.g. high-Ni cathode, Si-based anode, high voltage liquid 
electrolyte). Additionally, modifications may be needed for reaching 
requirements for higher-power cells. Process modifications may cover e.g. 
water-based coating, high speed coating and stacking, … and should also 
consider the possibility to deal with different cell formats and sizes: larger cells 
enable quality-optimised handling of thin sheet material, which combined with a 
greater thickness of active materials, results in higher energy densities and fast 
charging ability. Use of large format cells may also benefit battery pack 
manufacturers (incl. OEMs) due to lower complexity (fewer connections, simpler 
thermal balancing system, simpler electronics). 
Production of generation-4 and 5 cells will require more substantial changes to 
the production process, particularly for processing and coating of electrode 
materials and for manufacturing of solid electrolytes. For these chemistries no 
known significant manufacturing base has yet been developed by any Asian LIB 
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manufacturerqq. This provides an opportunity for Europe to break-in to cell 
manufacturing for these chemistries. 
The needed flexibility for handling chemistries of both generation 3 and 
subsequent generations with different cell sizes and formats can be achieved in 
two ways: 
o Dual line design: one (larger) line is used for production of 
batteries with conventional chemistries and formats, while a 
second flexible line allows introduction of new 
materials/techniques/formats that can be scaled up quickly when 
needed. 
o modular design plants, whereby modules connected in series in 
the overall production line, can be individually exchanged, 
modified and/or expanded. 
All the above measures should not jeopardise efforts to increase the efficiency of 
the overall cell manufacturing process in terms of the inter-related parameters 
of time, costs and quality. A number of areas in particular merit attention [56]:  
 Acceleration of formation and ageing of battery cells to reduce process 
time and associated storage periods and thereby reduce the impact of 
high capital costs. 
 Reduction of the size of dry (humidity-controlled) clean rooms needed for 
reducing possibilities of  contaminant ingress during electrode coating, 
drying, calendaring, electrolyte filling, and cell assembly, including cell 
sealing 
 Designing cells (format, size, manufacturing processes, labeling) so that 
their constituent materials can easily be recycled. 
 
All of the above evidently benefit from implementation of the opportunities 
offered by "Manufacturing 4.0": e.g. the ability to deal with vast data volumes in 
the production process, new forms of human-machine interaction, advanced 
robotics and 3-D printing, new and increased capabilities for traceability of 
process parameters, etc. 
                                           
qq Note however the recently announced Toyota effort into using solid-state LIBs for their xEVs as of 
2022. 
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Annex III. Overview of EC activities on batteries structured along the value chain 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: http://europea.eu/contact 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
doi:10.2760/75757
ISBN 978-92-79-74292-7
K
J-N
A
-2
8
8
3
7
-EN
-N
 
